This piece was originally written last year for a journal whose editors accepted it and then, having paid for it, decided not to print it. Mantel’s book is now hardly new any longer; nor is it a classic, not yet at any rate. But I think it is still topical, because the idea of the State as God appears to be growing more popular every year.
Hilary Mantel’s Wolf Hall is a fictionalized account of the life of Thomas Cromwell, one of the architects of Henry VIII’s reformation of the English Church. It was published in April 2009 and has won the Man Booker prize and more recently, the National Book Critics’ Circle award. It has attracted unreserved praise from a great number of reviewers in the most prestigious papers. The novel’s overwhelming success is surprising for a very long work about what is, after all, the best-known period of English history. The fact that it is highly readable is certainly one reason for this success, but there may be another. Most works of history or historical fiction (excluding bodice-rippers) that reach a broad audience do so because they address current fears or longings, and this is very true of Mantel’s novel. It is about Cromwell, yes, but it is also about religious fanaticism, social dislocation, and how best to govern an unruly people, all matters of pressing concern to contemporary Britons. For Wolf Hall is a Whig history: it offers us a Cromwell much like ourselves as our eye into the past, while we are the novel’s heroes.
Mantel’s account of Cromwell’s life begins with a scene in which his violent father has knocked the youth to the ground. Skimming lightly over his youthful adventures on the Continent, it goes on to recount the story of his friendship with his patron, Cardinal Wolsey, the genial papal legate, who tries and fails to secure a divorce for Henry VIII. Cromwell recovers from Wolsey’s downfall and commits himself to the service of the king, where he goes from one success to the next. His intelligence, his gift for languages, his understanding of money and trade, his administrative ability, and his political shrewdness all contribute to making him a very useful man, and ultimately a very powerful one. It is not until the second half of the novel that Cromwell gradually becomes embroiled in the affair that made his career, the Boleyn family’s attempt to negotiate a marriage between Anne and the lovesick Henry. Although instrumental in arranging her marriage, Cromwell betrays Anne in the end: he is a new kind of servant who places loyalty to the state above personal ties.
Once this intrigue is concluded, Mantel gives short shrift to some of the other important events in Cromwell’s life: his involvement in the dissolution of the monasteries, for example, (although she seldom fails to point out how their inhabitants were parasites); or his persecution of heretics, redefined as enemies of the state after Henry’s break with Rome. The novel ends with the separation of Sir Thomas More’s head from his body, and Cromwell (or the narrator, it’s not quite clear) telling himself, “Today, More was escorted to the scaffold by Humphrey Monmouth . . . Monmouth is too good a man to rejoice in the reversal of fortune. But perhaps we can rejoice for him?”
Mantel’s use of Cromwell as the only set of eyes through whom we view the action of the novel, her sympathetic portrayal of scenes from Cromwell’s childhood and domestic life, some of which are certainly her own invention, and her skilful elisions of most of the minister’s less appealing or justifiable actions, allows her to turn Cromwell into a new man for all seasons, a rebuke to the figure of Thomas More in Robert Bolt’s play by that name. In fact, Mantel’s Cromwell is something of a “Mary Sue,” a wish-fulfilment figure, and one who is rather too good to be true. His actions as depicted by Mantel are always justifiable; he never fails in any enterprise except through the failures of others; he is seldom shown to be wrong about anything; and he appears to be gifted with nearly superhuman foresight, although of course all this must falter in the second book Mantel is to write, as Cromwell in turn becomes the victim of his sovereign’s paranoia.
Mantel’s portrait of Sir Thomas More, who might be said to be the villain of the novel, is too wicked to be convincing, even for those disinclined to hagiography. Mantel sets up More as a foil to Cromwell. While More is a sadistic masochist who teases his wife ferociously, wears hair-shirts, and tortures heretics, Cromwell, who was historically responsible for torturing rather more people than More, is shown to be kind to wives, servants, children, and dogs. While More is a slippery, self-aggrandizing courtier with a penchant for dramatic gestures, Cromwell is a plain-spoken, pragmatic administrator often insulted for his low birth. Above all, while More is a fanatical Christian (though of course also a man on the make), Cromwell is a rational man for whom the pursuit of God is not the first goal of human life.
There is no doubt that Mantel’s Cromwell is more appealing than Mantel’s More. The question is, does she create an accurate portrait of either man? It is difficult for one who is not a specialist in Tudor history to answer that question. Other questions present themselves to the detached reader. Was Cromwell really so good a father? Was More really so terrible a husband? The contemporary records are mixed, and Mantel does not indicate her sources. Those reviewers who proclaim her book to be astonishingly well-researched are surely saying more than they can know from what Mantel has provided for us in her work. Verisimilitude and plausibility are admirable qualities in an historical novel, but they are not the same as historical accuracy. Finally, while Cromwell may have been, as many English historians have concluded, the architect of the modern English state, that does not mean that the real Cromwell would have appealed to modern tastes any better than More, either as a personality or a political actor. Neither man recognised the individual conscience as the supreme authority in determining matters of right and wrong. Neither man hesitated to execute those people who rebelled against established authority. They were not like us, and for Ms Mantel to make Cromwell more like us to make his policies more sympathetic is a kind of cheating.
Mantel’s book supports neither the Protestants nor the Catholics in the English Reformation. For example, she writes admiringly of the obviously Romish Cardinal Wolsey, a man who stood for everything that Protestant reformers hated about Catholic priests and the papacy. She is critical of the Reformer William Tyndale, whose zeal and adherence to principle she finds distasteful. She turns her sights neither on Catholicism nor the Reformation, but on religious fanaticism, or, as we say today, “fundamentalism.” She paints More in an unflattering light because the deaths for which he was responsible were carried out in the service of religion. Worse, More, like Tyndale, was willing to die for a point of principle. Yet she accepts or excuses the executions for which Cromwell was responsible because they were carried out in service of the state.
Leaving aside the question of whether Mantel’s portraits of Cromwell or More are historically accurate, readers ought to ask themselves whether the fanaticism she deplores was really as pernicious as she thinks, or whether it might even have been a necessary ingredient in bringing about the kind of polity that good liberals admire. Without the fanatic Luther to declare, “here I stand; I can do no other,” would the nations of Europe really have been able to throw off the yoke of Rome, as Mantel would no doubt describe it? Without the fanatics who translated the Bible into modern tongues would literacy have spread the way it did in Protestant nations, and then, as the Catholic Church fought back, in Catholic nations as well? Could we have achieved our present liberty of conscience, fragile as it may be, without the fanatics who were willing to die (and sometimes kill) not for the claims of the subjective conscience, but for that which they thought was indisputably right? It is courage and not political expediency that sets an example to be remembered down the ages and leads people to question received truths.
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That’s too bad, that they decided not to publish your review, though at least you still got paid for your work. Any idea as to why they changed their mind?
I assume you are referencing Butterfield’s “The Whig Interpretation of History”, eh? Would that more people read that excellent tome. It seems that far too many people today cannot look at the past without interpreting it through a contemporary lens, and of course, Hollywood and today’s education systems encourage this, alas.
Indeed, fanatics get things done, while respectable people sit back with a “wait and see” attitude, at first, anyway.
I’m not certain why they decided not to publish. The journal in question had gone through many editorial upheavals at the time and perhaps the editors had simply lost track of what they were doing.
Yes, I suppose in a way I was referencing Butterfield, but I don’t think that the idea of history as “Whiggish” or otherwise originated with him. He analyzed the habit, however, and showed how it operated in various habits of mind within the Anglosphere, so all historians owe him a debt.
Re: fanatics “getting things done”. True enough, though I don’t think that’s quite what I meant in the last paragraphs of my review. I can just imagine some whiggish type (a Hitchens, perhaps? He’s always been a whig historian although at times he’s also been a Marxist) muttering “yes, that’s exactly what worries me about them.”
What I was trying to say was that freedom of conscience and liberty of speech as actual practices within a polity emerged out of the clash of conflicting convictions and institutional demands that emerged out of the chaos of the Reformation/Counter-Reformation.
This is hard for me to explain, so forgive me if I seem to be taking a roundabout way to make my point. Some questions to ask yourself:
1) Do you think that a person with no strong convictions would have been able to stand up to either the power of the state or the church telling him that he is a criminal who will die a terrible death if he does not recant, AND is also in danger of losing his immortal soul? It’s unlikely, isn’t it? It requires passionately held convictions to withstand such threats to one’s physical and moral safety; it requires what would certainly appear to a modern person to be “fanaticism”.
2) Would such “fanatics” not be likely to inspire others, only slightly less radical and brave, who would in turn stand up to the threat of torture and death for what they believed in? Some might even form armies and try to seize control of the states in which they lived, to secure the right to worship as they saw fit. Some might even succeed. (Atheists might pull this off too – but they would have to be really fanatical atheists…)
3) After observing many decades of religious upheavals of this kind, might governments and/or churches not sooner or later begin to say, this is enough; we cannot do this any more? We are losing all our people; everyone is starving because the peasants can’t farm with all those soldiers tramping through putting down rebellions; we can’t even collect any taxes. How can we stop it?
4) At this point, might a handful of statesmen and a few philosophers and other like observers not begin to argue that perhaps it was better for states to allow citizens to worship as they saw fit, if they shared certain fundamental assumptions and beliefs about the world (as most Christians did, Catholic or protestant)? And particularly if these citizens agreed to obey long-established laws, could they not be left alone?
5) Meanwhile, if we suppose the fanatical opponents of Catholicism had never existed, what then? Who would have been left to protest against the excesses and follies of the early modern Church? Well, only the State. Who would protest the excesses of the State? Only the Church.
6) In response to these threats, the two bodies would have gone head to head – as they had been doing for several centuries, with increasing intensity, in various parts of western Europe. If the State had won a decisive victory in this battle (and it nearly did, but not quite), religion would have been suppressed altogether, if possible, or co-opted so that it was one more means by which the state secured the loyalty of its citizens. As it had done in the days of the Roman Empire, when the emperor had asked early Christians to worship him.
Some non-believers, especially those who profess to hate religious fanaticism, claim that they would not object to a religion that was a mere frill or ornament within a well-run state, but I suspect they have not paused to consider the full implications of this position. There is no reason to assume that a state that had triumphantly suppressed freedom of religious expression, would then proceed to allow any other kind of freedom of expression – is there? Consider China, in which religion was a social element of very limited importance long before the rise of Communism and the post-Communist Chinese state. What kind of freedom of conscience or expression has China ever had?
This is why I believe that liberals and atheists (not necessarily the same people, of course) who cherish their freedoms and despise fanaticism, nevertheless owe a debt to the fanatics of western Christendom. I only wish more of them were able to perceive it.
p.s. Question 7) If the Catholic Church had prevailed over the emerging states of early modern Europe, what then? Well, affairs would have continued in the medieval fashion: the Church-as-government would have been flexible in matters of morality, intransigent in matters that threatened the state. True believers would have been shocked by the Church-state’s cynicism, and one day some monk in a fit of outrage would have nailed his theses to the wall…
Yes, I realize that our heritage of political and social freedom in the English-speaking world grew out of the many clashes between variously mutually-incompatible absolutist ‘intolerant’ worldviews, that occurred in England around the time of the Reformation, through to the Revolution and the Restoration; that indeed, pluralism arose out of the finally recognized need of the various parties to find a modus vivendi with each other. Funny how, at least, in Butterfield’s day, progressives were willing to mistakenly see the Reformers as their own; i.e. they were inclined to generosity of spirit towards them; whereas today, having won their battles, they’re happy to be equally prejudiced against traditionalist Catholics and Protestants alike. In some ways, the status quo is certainly preferable, insofar as it tends to clarify things rather than muddify them (as progressives’ false idolization of Reformers did).
Strange coincidence: one day last week something reminded me of this blog and I looked at it for the first time in a long time. I had concluded a while back that the hiatus was permanent. But not only was there a new post, but it had been made just a day or two before I looked. Anyway, glad to see you back.
About this book: I suppose you read C. Hitchens’s review in The Atlantic? A very different view, to say the least, in sync with Mantel’s. I’m naive enough to have been a little surprised by his vilification of Thomas More–I mean, I thought CH would at least have shown some respect for his fidelity and courage.
“… Cromwell much like ourselves as our eye into the past, while we are the novel’s heroes.” Excellent.
Well, I didn’t give Hitchens that much credit because the man is so irrational where anyone connected with religion is concerned. At the same time, though, I was indeed thinking of him and other “New Atheist” types when I wrote this review. The liberalism they cherish depends, historically, on the existence of the fanatics whom they despise.
Regarding Mantel’s Cromwell, as far as I can make out, he is a figure of fantasy. I don’t mean that he’s entirely invented, of course, but rather that the personality he displays is her own creation.